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A B S T R A C T
Background: Since Belgium legalised euthanasia, the number of performed euthanasia cases for psychological
suﬀering in psychiatric patients has signiﬁcantly increased, as well as the number of media reports on con-
troversial cases. This has prompted several healthcare organisations and committees to develop policies on the
management of these requests.
Method: Five recent initiatives that oﬀer guidance on euthanasia requests by psychiatric patients in Flanders
were analysed: the protocol of Ghent University Hospital and advisory texts of the Flemish Federation of
Psychiatry, the Brothers of Charity, the Belgian Advisory Committee on Bioethics, and Zorgnet-Icuro. These were
examined via critical point-by-point reﬂection, focusing on all legal due care criteria in order to identify: 1)
proposed measures to operationalise the evaluation of the legal criteria; 2) suggestions of additional safeguards
going beyond these criteria; and 3) remaining ﬁelds of tension.
Results: The initiatives are well in keeping with the legal requirements but are often more stringent. Additional
safeguards that are formulated include the need for at least two positive advices from at least two psychiatrists;
an a priori evaluation system; and a two-track approach, focusing simultaneously on the assessment of the
patient's euthanasia request and on that person's continuing treatment. Although the initiatives are similar in
intent, some diﬀerences in approach were found, reﬂecting diﬀerent ethical stances towards euthanasia and an
emphasis on practical clinical assessment versus broad ethical reﬂection.
Conclusions: All initiatives oﬀer useful guidance for the management of euthanasia requests by psychiatric pa-
tients. By providing information on, and proper operationalisations of, the legal due care criteria, these in-
itiatives are important instruments to prevent potential abuses. Apart from the additional safeguards suggested,
the importance of a decision-making policy that includes many actors (e.g. the patient's relatives and other care
providers) and of good aftercare for the bereaved are rightly stressed. Shortcomings of the initiatives relate to the
aftercare of patients whose euthanasia request is rejected, and to uncertainty regarding the way in which at-
tending physicians should manage negative or conﬂicting advices, or patients' suicide threats in case of refusal.
Given the scarcity of data on how thoroughly and uniformly requests are handled in practice, it is unclear to
what extent the recommendations made in these guidelines are currently being implemented.
1. Introduction
In 2002, Belgium conditionally de-criminalised euthanasia per-
formed by a physician, legally deﬁned as ‘intentionally terminating life
by someone other than the person concerned, at the latter's request’.
The Belgian Euthanasia Law, however, lays down several substantive
and procedural due care criteria that need to be fulﬁlled in order for
euthanasia to be legally permissible (see Box A). On the basis of their
freedom of conscience and their professional autonomy, physicians are
at liberty to refuse involvement or to make their involvement depen-
dent upon the fulﬁlment of additional requirements (Belgian Oﬃcial
Gazette, 2002).
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Euthanasia is only legally allowed in the BeNeLux countries (i.e.
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), Canada, and Colombia.
Laws on medical assistance in dying, excluding euthanasia, are im-
plemented and eﬀective in Switzerland and the following American
States: Oregon, Washington, Montana, Vermont, California (Emanuel,
Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Urwin, & Cohen, 2016), Hawaii, Colorado, and
Washington D.C. (Death with Dignity National Center (DD), 2018).
Recently and strictly taken, the Australian State of Victoria has legalised
medical assistance in dying, though also euthanasia in case of a patient
being physically incapable of the self-administration of the lethal drug
substance (Parliament of Victoria, 2017).
Under the Belgian Euthanasia Law, euthanasia is allowed not only
for patients who are expected to die within the foreseeable future but
also for patients who are not expected to die within the foreseeable
future (in which case the Law requires the fulﬁlment of additional due
care criteria). The latter is almost always the case for psychiatric pa-
tients. In line with a general increase of euthanasia cases, the number of
cases of euthanasia for psychological suﬀering is steadily rising
(Chambaere, Vander Stichele, Mortier, Cohen, & Deliens, 2015; Smets
et al., 2009). Analysis of the biennial reports of the Belgian Federal
Control and Evaluation Commission for Euthanasia (FCECE) indicate
that, whereas euthanasia for psychological suﬀering in psychiatric pa-
tients was virtually nonexistent between 2002 and 2007, numbers in-
creased to an average of eight per year between 2008 and 2010, then to
approximately 30 per year between 2011 and 2013, and to approxi-
mately 60 per year in 2014 and 2015, before decreasing to approxi-
mately 40 per year in 2016 and 2017 (Dierickx, Deliens, Cohen, &
Chambaere, 2017; Federal Control and Evaluation Committee for
Euthanasia, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018).
Euthanasia for psychological suﬀering in psychiatric patients gives
rise to signiﬁcant concerns regarding the assessment of several of the
due care criteria set out in the Law, including: 1) the patient's mental
competence, as this might be aﬀected by a psychiatric disorder; 2) the
requirement for the psychiatric disorder to be incurable, as some
(symptoms of) psychiatric disorders tend to change over time; 3) the
requirement for the well-considered nature of the request, as a death
wish may be a symptom of a psychiatric disorder; 4) the constant and
unbearable nature of the psychological suﬀering, given that a clear
deﬁnition and an eﬀective assessment instrument are still lacking; and
5) the requirement of the non-alleviability of the psychological suf-
fering.
As a result, the clinical assessment of these criteria is very diﬃcult
and extreme care should be required before a request from a psychiatric
patient for euthanasia for psychological suﬀering is granted (Naudts
et al., 2006). To illustrate the contentiousness of this issue, case reviews
in the Netherlands suggest that in some of the reported cases of eu-
thanasia on patients suﬀering from a psychiatric disorder some of the
due care criteria may have been evaluated suboptimally (Doernberg,
Peteet, & Kim, 2016; Kim, De Vries, & Peteet, 2016). Remarkably,
however, no such research on Belgian cases has been conducted.
Prompted by the lack of clarity of some of the legal due care criteria,
some hospitals have developed protocols to manage requests for eu-
thanasia for psychological suﬀering (Behaegel, Vercoutere, & Matthys,
2015). In addition, three end-of-life consultation centres (ULteam in
2011, LEIF Western-Flanders in 2013 and LEIF.Ghent in 2015) have
been established by the association LEIF (Life End Information Forum),
which was founded in 2003 with the aim to provide information about,
and assistance in, end-of-life care (Van Wesemael et al., 2009, 2010).
However, the considerable increase in cases of euthanasia for psycho-
logical suﬀering and media reports on controversial cases – of which
one has been referred to the public prosecutor (Mason & Weitenberg,
2015; Symons, 2015) and another one has been referred to the Court of
Assize (Hope, 2018) – raise concerns about a potentially overly per-
missive approach (Cliﬀord, 2017). As a consequence, some critics
suggest the banning of euthanasia for psychological suﬀering, whereas
some organisations and institutions have published guidelines that may
enhance the quality of practices.
The aim of our study is to analyse the ﬁve Belgian guidelines that
have recently been issued regarding the Belgian practice of psychiatric
patients requesting euthanasia for psychological suﬀering (see Box B),
in order to identify and discuss: 1) the measures proposed to oper-
ationalise the legal requirements; 2) suggestions for additional safe-
guards going beyond the legal requirements; and 3) suggestions re-
garding the most important issues that are not addressed in the Belgian
Euthanasia Law. These guidelines will be analysed using a critical
point-by-point reﬂection, focusing on each of the substantive and pro-
cedural legal due care criteria. This allows us to formulate general re-
commendations for an ethically sound clinical practice in Belgium, and
will allow readers in other jurisdictions considering adopting eu-
thanasia legislation to identify helpful lessons regarding medical as-
sistance in dying concerning this speciﬁc patient group.
Note that the Belgian Act on Euthanasia became eﬀective in the
same year as the Dutch ‘Termination of Life on Request and Assisted
Suicide (Review Procedures) Act’. The Dutch Act contains similar sub-
stantive and procedural criteria that must be followed if a patient re-
quests euthanasia. The Dutch Association for Psychiatry published its
guidelines on how physicians should assess requests for euthanasia
from patients with psychiatric disorders in 2009 (Tholen et al., 2009),
the same year when Ghent University Hospital developed its step-by
step protocol (I). The other guidelines that we discuss in this paper (II-
IV) are heavily inspired by the recommendations and suggestions made
in the ﬁrst two editions of the Dutch guidelines (published in 2004 and
2009), but adapted to the Belgian legal context (e.g. the requirement
that for euthanasia of a non-terminally ill patient two physicians should
be consulted instead of one, as prescribed by the Dutch Act).
Switzerland has no legislation on medical assistance in dying but its
criminal law provisions on assistance to suicide (Article 115 of the
Criminal Code) do not criminalise assisted suicide for non-selﬁsh mo-
tives. Some non-proﬁt organisations (e.g. EXIT and Dignitas) provide
assisted suicide to terminally and non-terminally ill psychiatric patients
who request physician assistance in dying, subject to the fulﬁlment of
the due care criteria set out in the organisations' own dedicated pro-
tocols.
As for Canada, following the adoption of the Law on Medical
Assistance in Dying, many provinces have developed policies for med-
ical assistance in dying for terminally ill patients, e.g. Ontario's Policy
Statement on Medical Assistance in Dying (CPSO (The College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario), 2016). A discussion to expand the
Canadian Law to also include the non-terminally ill is still ongoing. The
Council of Canadian Academies recently published three ‘ﬁnal reports’
of Expert Panels on Medical Assistance in Dying for Mature Minors, on
Advance Requests, and concerning cases in which a Mental Disorder is
the Sole Underlying Medical Condition (Council of Canadian
Academies, 2018).
This paper was constructed as follows. First, each of the substantive
and procedural legal criteria was noted down in a structured bullet
point list. Second, when reading the ﬁrst guideline, every piece of in-
formation on the substantive and procedural legal criteria and on the
possible additional due care criteria discussed in the guideline was
systematically collected, noted down, and summarised under the re-
levant legal criterion on that list. This method was repeated for each of
the subsequent guidelines. Subsequently, the similarities and diﬀer-
ences between the guidelines were examined, with particular attention
to the way in which they interpreted the legal criteria and to sugges-
tions to include additional due care criteria.
2. The substantive criteria for eligibility for euthanasia in Belgium
2.1. Characteristics of the patient
The ﬁrst substantive criteria concern two patient characteristics,
namely the patient's age and mental competence.
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2.1.1. The age of the patient
The Euthanasia Law stipulates that the patient who requests eu-
thanasia must either be an adult (i.e. 18 years of age or older) or an
emancipated minor (i.e. a minor who, as a result of marriage, or after
the age of 15 and on the basis of an order by the juvenile court, is
legally competent to autonomously make decisions that touch upon
their person). In 2014, the Euthanasia Law was extended to all minors,
regardless of age, who have the capacity for discernment, but only in
relation to euthanasia for physical suﬀering and only if additional legal
criteria are fulﬁlled (Raus, 2016; Van Assche, Raus, Vanderhaegen, &
Sterckx, 2018).
2.1.2. Mental competence
To be eligible for euthanasia, the patient must have legal capacity
(i.e. must not have been placed under guardianship). In addition, the
Euthanasia Law requires patients to be able to make a well-considered
request and so to have the necessary mental competence. This means
that they need to be able to demonstrate the ability to understand the
real implications of a euthanasia request. Finally, patients also need to
be conscious at the moment of making the request.
Some physicians, including psychiatrists, question mental compe-
tence in (some) psychiatric patients who are suﬀering. The ﬁve guide-
lines that are the topic of this paper acknowledge that mental compe-
tence can indeed be reduced due to a patient's psychopathology (e.g.
temporary psychoses), but they emphasise that this is not automatically
the case. In that respect, mental competence should be considered as
being task dependent. In the context of a euthanasia request, most of
the guidelines (II–V) identify reasons to assume that some psychiatric
patients can make a reasoned, well-considered choice for termination of
life, accompanied by suitable emotions, and to a certain degree also
irrespective of psychopathology. For example, some patients suﬀering
from recurrent depressive, manic or even psychotic episodes ﬁnd
themselves also in temporarily symptom-free waiting periods of re-
mission, before the eventual likelihood of symptom recurrence and/or
relapse. Like the psychopathology itself, a patient's mental competence
can thus change over time.
However, physicians face great diﬃculties regarding the evaluation
of mental competence in psychiatric patients. Representing the pro-
fessional group of psychiatrists, one of the guidelines (IV) speciﬁes the
clinical assessment of mental competence on the basis of four criteria.
First, the degree of the following four cognitive competencies should be
assessed in patients: 1) the ability to make and communicate personal
choices; 2) the ability to comprehend the information provided; 3) the
ability to apply this information to one's own context and situation; and
4) the ability to reason and deliberate. Second, a properly considered
euthanasia request must be present (i.e. a ‘ﬂash of the moment’-decision
must be excluded), and must be accompanied by appropriate emotions.
In this respect, ambivalence could also be interpreted as a logical
consequence of fear of death, rather than as a symptom of reduced
mental competence. Moreover, ambivalence could also be used as a
lever to get the patient to focus (again) on exploring options of recovery
or rehabilitation. Third, a euthanasia request that could be attributed
directly to a symptom of the patient's disorder must be rejected. Fourth,
the presence of a suﬃcient degree of ‘practical rationality’ must be
present. More speciﬁcally, the patient should be able to place her eu-
thanasia request in the context of values and goals that are meaningful
to herself and that are not overly inﬂuenced by her psychopathology.
Regarding the evaluation of the patient's mental competence, four of
the guidelines highly recommend taking suﬃcient time and making use
of hetero anamnesis (II-V) and interdisciplinary consultation (I-V).
Suicidality receives speciﬁc attention in three guidelines (III-V), as this
is inherent to many psychiatric disorders. A distinction is made between
acute and rational suicidal ideations and plans. It is proposed that the
latter should be subject to therapeutic treatment processes that can run
parallel with the euthanasia procedure (starting after a euthanasia re-
quest has been formally expressed). Involuntary admission to a
psychiatric ward should only be considered in cases of acute suicidality,
resulting from a serious psychiatric disorder, and only when the pa-
tient's safety cannot be ensured via voluntary treatment (IV).
2.2. Characteristics of the euthanasia request
The Euthanasia Law requires that the euthanasia request is “vo-
luntary, well-considered and repeated, and not the result of external
pressure”.
2.2.1. Voluntary euthanasia request
Voluntariness implies that the patient's euthanasia request is not the
result of mistaken beliefs or of coercion or undue inﬂuence. The ex-
clusion of external pressure from the patient's social environment can
be addressed by means of hetero anamnesis and observation of the
patient's interaction with family and friends. However, some of the
guidelines (II, IV,V) also recommend excluding irrational internal
pressure originating from the patient's psychopathology in terms of a
perceived sense of guilt or feeling of being a burden to others. In this
regard, one of the guidelines (IV) indicates that the perception of being
a burden can be grounded in the patient's awareness that this burden is
a real and logical consequence of one's psychopathology. For instance,
in cases of chronic behavioural disorders, the burden on families can be
manifold: from emotionally coping with a patient's distressing beha-
viour, over disruption of household routine, to restriction of social ac-
tivities. It is argued that this type of rational internal pressure need not
be a reason to reject the patient's euthanasia request in advance (IV).
2.2.2. Well-considered euthanasia request
This criterion, wich is closely related to the issue of mental com-
petence, is concretised as follows in the guidelines that elaborate on it
(II,IV,V). The patient should express a clear and well-considered death
wish, taking into account aspects of the patient's life that make it worth
living, and based on suﬃcient self-knowledge and capacity to cogni-
tively process all information on (the consequences of) the condition
and the available treatment options. The legal condition of a well-
considered euthanasia request presupposes that the patient has been
well-informed by the physician concerning: 1) her (psycho)pathology;
2) possible ways to alleviate her suﬀering; 3) side eﬀects of the avail-
able treatment options; and 4) the prognosis (with and without treat-
ment).
In the context of euthanasia, physicians need to be alert to the pa-
tient's cognitive and emotional information processing and should in-
form the patient on: 1) the physician's own stance on euthanasia in
general and the patient's euthanasia request in particular; and 2)
available alternatives to euthanasia, including palliative care. When a
physician decides to become involved in a patient's euthanasia proce-
dure, clear information should also be given on the euthanasia proce-
dure itself, including on the need for multiple consultations and the
involvement of other physicians and, where relevant, important others.
One guideline (IV) also addresses the diﬃculties in case of a psy-
chiatric patient's reduced awareness of illness. According to guideline
V, that is precisely the reason why physicians need to act with the
greatest caution. For a euthanasia request to be legally justiﬁable, the
patient must be aware of the symptoms and the consequences of her
disorder by way of her realising how it aﬀects her behaviour and life
situation. The following example has been given in guideline IV: “In
case of depressive disorders, a patient can present and argue her eu-
thanasia request from a pessimistic, nihilistic view of herself, her past,
and future life, while more objective facts that shed a more realistic
light on her past, present, and future do not enter the assessment pro-
cess. The patient's opinions are then distorted, while not realising the
consequences of her mental state.”(Vlaamse Vereniging voor
Psychiatrie, 2017, p. 23) In these clearly symptom-induced periods of
psychopathology, the patient should not be considered eligible for eu-
thanasia.
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The guideline further deﬁnes a suﬃcient degree of self-knowledge
and of awareness of illness as follows: “the patient's knowledge of her
own personal qualities that have an essential inﬂuence on her quality of
life, implying the realisation of how certain character traits inﬂuence
her perception of her interaction with others”(Vlaamse Vereniging voor
Psychiatrie, 2017, p. 23). However, and especially in case of personality
disorders, some guidelines (II and IV) acknowledge that the patient-
physician-interaction can be strongly inﬂuenced by pathological per-
sonality characteristics of which the patient may be unaware. These
characteristics do sometimes not only aﬀect the patient's suﬀering, but
also the tendency to undermine treatment compliance and other life
support, which is challenging in the context of a euthanasia request
from a medical and ethical perspective. According to these guidelines,
both the patient and the psychiatrist must endeavor to achieve a degree
of insight that is as substantial as reasonably can be expected on the
basis of the patient's psychosocial and intellectual background. It is
acknowledged that an optimal awareness of illness and an optimal self-
knowledge may be essential for the success of a medical treatment or
rehabilitation plan. Hence, an insuﬃcient degree of self-knowledge and
awareness of illness is, in their opinion, a reason to prolong the eu-
thanasia procedure in order to provide suﬃcient time for patient in-
formation and psycho-education.
2.2.3. Repeated and durable euthanasia request
It should be the case that the patient repeatedly expresses a death
wish towards the physicians involved. According to the guidelines, it is
preferable that the patient has also expressed her death wish towards
her close inner circle of family or friends (II–V). The patient's request
must be spread out over a period of several months, in order to exclude
a ‘ﬂash of the moment’-decision and to allow suﬃcient time to assess
the origin and evolution of the death wish (I–V). In addition, the pa-
tient's request should be durable. In case the abovementioned expressed
ambivalence between the patient's fear of death would over time di-
minish or even disappear and if, as a result, the death wish would be-
come more pronounced, this would be a sign that the patient had made
up her mind (IV).
2.3. Characteristics of the patient's condition
According to the Euthanasia Law, euthanasia is only allowed if the
patient who requests euthanasia is suﬀering from a serious and incur-
able condition, caused by illness or accident.
2.3.1. Serious character of the condition: the presence of a diagnosable
condition
For a euthanasia request to be eligible, it needs to be based on a
medical somatic and/or psychiatric disorder. Two of the guidelines (II,
IV) introduce a further distinction between a euthanasia procedure
involving a patient suﬀering from a psychiatric disorder and a proce-
dure involving a patient suﬀering from a neuropsychiatric (e.g. de-
mentia) disorder, declaring that the latter procedure requires a slightly
diﬀerent approach from the one discussed in their recommendations
concerning the assessment of euthanasia requests from psychiatric pa-
tients. Regardless of the speciﬁc type of condition, the condition does
not only need to be serious and incurable, but also medically diag-
nosable. Psychiatric disorders, even in the absence of somatic co-diag-
noses, are recognised as diagnosable medical conditions.
2.3.2. Incurable nature of the condition
The evaluation of the legal requirement of incurability is left to the
expert opinion of the physician involved as it should be based on the
current state of the art of medicine. Diﬀerent terminologies are used in
practice to address this legal criterion. Some psychiatrists use the
concept ‘medical futility’ in order to refer to treatment resistance, or to
ineﬀective or inappropriate treatment. Some guidelines (III, V) refer to
persisting intense debates in the literature regarding the question as to
whether, and if so when, a psychiatric condition can be considered
incurable as these types of conditions frequently change over time
(Broome & de Cates, 2015; Claes et al., 2015; Kelly, 2017; Schuklenk &
van de Vathorst, 2015; Trachsel, Irwin, Biller-Andorno, Hoﬀ, & Riese,
2016; Vandenberghe, 2017).
In some of the guidelines, to address this problem, the concept of ‘no
reasonable treatment perspective’ was introduced, which had earlier
been proposed and explained in the former guideline of the Dutch
Psychiatric Association (Tholen et al., 2009). According to the former
(and recently revised) guideline as well as some of the Belgian guide-
lines (II-V) discussed in this paper, therapeutic options for a particular
condition should be considered if they meet the following three re-
quirements: 1) a real prospect of improvement; 2) the possibility to
administer adequate treatment within a reasonable period of time; and
3) a reasonable balance between the expected treatment results and the
burden of treatment for the patient.
In an attempt to operationalise these three requirements, the fol-
lowing criteria have been formulated (IV). First, it is advised to fully
apply the current psychiatric State of the Art Treatment protocol in
terms of: 1) all indicated regular biological interventions; 2) all in-
dicated psychotherapeutic interventions; and 3) social interventions
that could alleviate the patient's suﬀering. These interventions should
be oﬀered by qualiﬁed caregivers. Second, to assess what would count
as a reasonable time period for these interventions, the following cri-
teria should be taken into account: 1) the patient's medical history; 2)
the duration of suggested pharmacological and psychotherapeutic
treatments; and 3) the patient's age. Third, the beneﬁts and dis-
advantages of interventions should be based on: 1) the plausibility,
expected nature, and expected extent of improvement; 2) the plausi-
bility, nature, and seriousness of side eﬀects; and 3) the patient's coping
capacity.
In some cases of euthanasia for psychological suﬀering, a recently
discovered (and thus previously missed) psychiatric diagnosis was in-
voked as an additional reason to consider the patient to be in a medical
condition without prospect of improvement. One guideline (IV)
strongly disagrees with such a view and recommends that new diag-
noses should be seen as a reason to explore the possibility of im-
provement.
The guidelines diﬀer in their recommendations for cases when pa-
tients refuse reasonable treatment options. One guideline (III) indicates
that no consensus was found on this issue, while other guidelines (II, IV)
recommend that the euthanasia must not be carried out in such a case.
2.4. Characteristics of the patient's suﬀering
According to the Euthanasia Law, euthanasia is only allowed if the
patient is in a condition of constant and unbearable physical or psy-
chological suﬀering that cannot be alleviated. The guidelines formulate
more objectiﬁable criteria in order to evaluate the various requirements
for the patient's suﬀering: the suﬀering should be assessed in multiple
consultations with the patient that are spread out over time, and the
assessment should, more speciﬁcally, be made by means of thorough
patient observation and examination of the patient's medical history
and life context. With the consent of the patient, physicians can obtain
access to the patient's medical record. Without this consent and thus
without access to the patient's medical ﬁles, a euthanasia request
cannot be legally admissible, as the law provides that all physicians
involved need to have access to the medical record. An interdisciplinary
evaluation of the patient's suﬀering is strongly recommended by all the
guidelines.
2.4.1. Physical or psychological suﬀering
According to the Law, a patient's euthanasia request needs to be
based on physical and/or psychological suﬀering that results from a
serious and incurable condition. The consequences of the patient's
condition will typically not be restricted to physical and/or
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psychological suﬀering alone, as they can also include social and ex-
istential aspects. The latter aspects cannot be fully evaluated from a
medical perspective. Recent qualitative research has revealed that some
socio-economic (e.g. social inequalities) and even ﬁnancial issues (e.g.
low income) are additional circumstances that can make patients con-
sider requesting euthanasia (Verhofstadt, Thienpont, & Peters, 2017).
This observation necessitates a broad societal debate, as euthanasia
should never be used as a way to resolve society's failings (Verhofstadt
et al., 2017). In this respect, it should be noted that physicians may play
an important role in reducing patients' social suﬀering by strengthening
their social environment, for instance by encouraging an open dialogue
between the patient and her family and social network (Norwood,
2005, 2007).
According to the Law, the euthanasia request should be based on
physical and/or psychological suﬀering that is directly caused by the
patient's medical condition. The biennial reports from the Federal
Control and Evaluation Commission for Euthanasia (FCECE) indicate
that most cases of euthanasia that are reported involve a combination of
physical and psychological suﬀering, as, for example, cancer patients
might suﬀer from a perceived loss of dignity, whereas patients with
anorexia nervosa can suﬀer from physical problems.
Diverging views exist on the precise meaning of the requirement of
causality in the Euthanasia Law (III) ((Belgisch Raadgevend Comité
voor Bio-ethiek (Belgian Advisory Committee on Bioethics), 2017).
Taking into account the subjective nature of suﬀering, some experts are
in favour of not strictly medicalising this criterion, out of fear that
psychiatric patients, in whom tissue damage is not always apparent,
might then be excluded from receiving euthanasia, whereas others
argue that completely disconnecting the suﬀering and the medical
condition (i.e. disregarding the causality requirement) would pave the
way for physicians to grant euthanasia requests that have no medical
basis and are therefore beyond their professional expertise. A key
question in this regard is which physician should evaluate the causal
relationship between the patient's medical condition and her suﬀering
(III). If this prominent role is entrusted to the attending physician alone
and not also to the two legally required consulted physicians, it can be
problematic if the former is not a psychiatrist. This is one of the reasons
why several of the guidelines (I, III–V) recommend that two of the
consulted physicians should be psychiatrists – instead of one, as pre-
scribed by the Euthanasia Law – and that in their assessment of the
fulﬁlment of the due care criteria these psychiatrists need to pay spe-
ciﬁc attention to evaluating the causal relationship between the pa-
tient's medical condition and her suﬀering. Obviously, establishing this
causal relationship is a complex task, even for experienced psychia-
trists.
2.4.2. Constant suﬀering
The constant nature of the suﬀering can be operationalised when
taking into account the origin, evolution, and continuity of the suf-
fering. For psychiatric disorders, even those with an episodic character,
symptoms can be chronicly and severely persistent, progressive, and/or
continuously alternating.
2.4.3. Unbearable suﬀering
The unbearability of suﬀering cannot easily be operationalised, as it
is inherently a subjective criterion and objective parameters are
lacking. Due to their predominantly non observable complaints and
frequent lack of neurobiological markers in patients with psychiatric
disorders, their suﬀering experiences are way more diﬃcult to assess.
There is no consensus on how and by whom (the patient and/or the
attending physician and/or others) the unbearable nature of the suf-
fering should be assessed (III). Some claim that this assessment should
be totally left to the patient. Others suggest that unbearability always
needs to include a medical component and that the requirement to
ascertain unbearability is closely related to the physician's task to de-
tect, suggest, and apply potential therapeutic solutions to alleviate the
patient's suﬀering. Despite these diﬀerences of opinion, a consensus can
be observed in the guidelines in the emphasis on the physician's em-
pathic understanding of the patient's perception and judgment of the
unbearability of her suﬀering, in the light of the patient's current and
past life context, the disabling consequences of her condition, her
physical and mental strength, her coping capacity, and her personality
(II–V).
2.4.4. Non-alleviability of the suﬀering
This criterion clearly encompasses a medical component and is
closely related to the criterion that a prospect of improvement should
be absent. It is left to the expert opinion of the physician(s) involved to
judge whether there are therapeutic options left to alleviate the pa-
tients' suﬀering and to discuss these options with the patient. The
Federal Control and Evaluation Commission for Euthanasia has re-
peatedly reported dissensus between its members regarding the ques-
tion how to understand and evaluate the requirement of non-allevia-
bility of unbearable (psychological) suﬀering (Federal Control and
Evaluation Committee for Euthanasia, 2008, p. 31, 2010, p. 23).
Guideline III questions the Commission's assumption that the ﬁnal
judgment on the non-alleviability of the suﬀering should be left to the
patient herself, when the Commission states that euthanasia can be
performed if the patient's refusal of further treatment options is based
on ‘severe treatment-related side eﬀects or treatment applications per-
ceived as unbearable’. According to this guideline, side eﬀects can only
emerge after a treatment option is applied. The Commission's view
could then, for instance, pave the way for a severely depressed patient
to refuse the state-of-the-art intervention of electroconvulsive therapy
(ECT) on the ground of perceptions of it being unbearable. By contrast,
guideline III explicitely prefers the approach as prescribed in the former
(and adopted in the recently revised) Guideline of the Dutch Psychiatric
Association, stating that it is part of the clinical and ethical duty of the
psychiatric profession to follow all the state-of-the-art medical proce-
dures before a request for euthanasia can be regarded as legally eligible.
3. The a priori procedure for decision-making regarding
euthanasia
3.1. A two-track approach
As regards the decision-making process that precedes the granting
or refusal of euthanasia requests, some of the guidelines clearly go
beyond the legal requirements with their explicit recommendation of a
two-track approach. This approach is characterized by focusing on life
by way of continuing treatment of the patient, in parallel with a focus
on death by way of assessing the patient's euthanasia request. This view
is based on two fundamental, although not absolute, ethical values:
respect for the autonomy of the patient by respecting and taking ser-
iously a patient's death wish, and the duty to protect human life by ﬁrst
exploring meaningful life perspectives for a patient who has expressed a
death wish (II, IV, V). The rationale behind this two-track approach is
that it should not be ruled out that the euthanasia request is a cry for
help and the result of suﬀering that might be adequately addressed by
other means. For that reason, whereas on the death track the reasons
for, and the eligibility of, a patient's euthanasia request will be ex-
plored, a life track will be pursued simultaneously, in which the alter-
natives to death will be explored from a medical and psychological as
well as from a social and existential perspective.
First, the patient's current treatment must be evaluated, intensiﬁed,
and/or otherwise adjusted, even if this means changing caregivers.
Second, the potential of psychiatric rehabilitation options must be ad-
dressed in order to enhance the patient's autonomy, social participation
(e.g. via social support groups or peer support groups) and, conse-
quently, quality of life. In addition, attention should be paid to op-
portunities for so-called ‘crustative care’: a specialised, tailor-made
‘palliative’ psychiatric care for those patients for whom there are no
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therapeutic options left in terms of alleviation of suﬀering, although
their quality of life, perception of dignity, and connectedness with
others could still be restored and enhanced. According to several
guidelines (II, IV, V), connectedness with others is a crucial condition
for the exercise of autonomy as patients can only make well-considered
choices when they are closely connected with important others. Third,
guidance needs to be oﬀered in the search for potential sources, goals,
and projects to regain meaning in life.
The physicians involved in the euthanasia procedure can focus on,
or be involved in, both tracks to a diﬀerent extent (IV). The main idea is
that each physician may combine these two tracks or may decide to just
focus on one track, but that both tracks should always be simulta-
neously explored. Interestingly, one guideline (I) emphasises that, as a
quintessential premise of their protocol, their hospital's psychiatrists
can only be involved in the assessment of a patient's euthanasia request
while the patient's own physician remains responsible for the treatment
of the patient's psychopathology. As for the other physicians involved,
the consulted physicians normally will focus only on the death track.
It should also be pointed out that there is an overlap between the
life track and the death track and between their underlying values (i.e.
respect for the autonomy of the patient vs. duty to protecting life), as
the death track might protect patients by preventing brutal suicide at-
tempts, whereas the life track might exceptionally lead to additional
suﬀering and even suicide attempts. Contrary to what has occassionaly
been reported in practice, a patient's request for euthanasia should not
be a suﬃcient reason for withholding treatment or hospitalisation in a
psychiatric ward.
3.2. Number and role of physicians involved
If the patient is not expected to die within the foreseeable future, the
Law requires that the euthanasia request be assessed by at least three
physicians: the attending physician and two consulted physicians. At
least one of these consulted physicians needs to be a psychiatrist or a
specialist in the patient's medical condition. To each of the physicians
involved, speciﬁc and limited roles are allocated by the Euthanasia Law
(Box A). The physician(s) should be independent from the patient and
from each other.
It is advised by guideline IV that the attending physician is the ﬁrst
to be consulted by the patient. In that speciﬁc role, the attending
physician should take the lead in the euthanasia procedure and refer the
patient to the physicians who will be acting as consulted physicians.
According to this guideline, this sequence is not always applied in
practice, as sometimes physicians are already consulted during the
euthanasia procedure before one of them refers the patient to a physi-
cian who would be willing to perform the euthanasia and therefore
takes on the role of attending physician at the end of the euthanasia
procedure. The latter illogical sequence is deemed ethically in-
appropriate in guideline IV, as it might cause the patient to be confused
over the exact role of the physicians involved. Some guidelines (II, IV)
recommend that both the attending and the consulted physicians have
several conversations with the patient. This goes beyond the Law's re-
quirements that, whereas the attending physician should have several
conversations with the patient, the consulted physicians merely need to
examine the patient and to review her medical record.
3.2.1. Speciﬁc role of the attending physician
The attending physician who approves a euthanasia request is not
obliged to perform euthanasia herself. In the context of building a re-
lationship of trust between the patient and the physician, the latter
needs to conceive of herself as being able and willing to perform eu-
thanasia if and when all legal requirements are fulﬁlled. The patient's
treating physician may also be the patient's attending physician as long
as the two-track approach and referrals to independent consulted
physicians are guaranteed (IV).
3.2.2. Speciﬁc role of the consulted physicians
Due to the complexity of euthanasia requests for psychological
suﬀering, it is suggested (IV, V) or prescribed (I) that two, instead of
one, of the consulted physicians should be psychiatrists and that they
should assess all substantive due care criteria, instead of only the cri-
teria that the Law requires them to assess (IV, V). In addition, it is
proposed (II, IV, V) or made mandatory (I) to also involve the patient's
treating physician in the procedure, although never as one of the con-
sulted physicians, in view of the risk of a biased assessment.
The Euthanasia Law requires the consulted physicians to be in-
dependent but does not specify how this is to be understood. However,
in its information brochure for physicians, the Federal Control and
Evaluation Commission for Euthanasia states that the consulted physi-
cians must not have a therapeutic relationship with the patient nor be a
relative or a hierarchical subordinate or superior to the attending
physician (Federal Control and Evaluation Committee for Euthanasia,
2015). Moreover, in the legal literature the view is advocated that the
consulted physician should not be a member of the attending physi-
cian's doctor's oﬃce or hospital department, although the condition of
independence does not require that consulted physicians should come
from outside the hospital where the attending physician is treating the
patient (Delbeke, 2014; Vansweevelt, 2003).
One guideline (I) has formulated speciﬁc rules on how to handle
euthanasia requests from patients who are referred from outside the
hospital's walls. The protocol stipulates that the attending psychiatrist
should only manage the patient's euthanasia request (i.e. should not
take over her treatment) and should have as many consultations with
the patient as needed to decide whether the legal requirements are met.
The results of the consultation and evaluation must be communicated to
the patient's treating psychiatrist. When the attending physician has
ascertained that the legal requirements have been fulﬁlled, the patient
must be referred to a second psychiatrist (i.e. the ﬁrst consulted psy-
chiatrist) within the hospital's department of psychiatry and, after that
person has provided a positive opinion, also to an independent third
psychiatrist (i.e. the second consulted psychiatrist) belonging to a de-
partment of psychiatry of another Flemish university hospital. The
second and third psychiatrist should review the patient's medical ﬁle
and have at least one consultation with the patient to independently
determine whether all legal requirements are met. To ensure in-
dependent decision-making, the second consulted psychiatrist from
outside the hospital is appointed by the multidisciplinary Hospital
Ethics Committee. Only when the three psychiatrists involved have
independently veriﬁed that all legal requirements are met, can eu-
thanasia be performed.
According to guideline IV, all legal requirements should be assessed
by each of the physicians involved, albeit not necessarily to the same
extent. This guideline states that the ﬁrst consulted psychiatrist, like the
attending physician, needs to address the underlying reasons for the
euthanasia request. This could lead to a strong relationship of trust that
may include the risk of transference (i.e. the euthanasia request and
procedure may provoke feelings in the patients) and counter-
transference (i.e. the patient's euthanasia request may provoke feelings
in the physician), that may decrease the objectivity and independent
judgment. Hence, the role of the second consulted psychiatrist should
be strictly limited to evaluating the legal due care criteria, with speciﬁc
attention to the non-alleviability of the suﬀering. This should reduce
the risk of bias due to (counter)transference.
3.3. Involvement of relatives or important others
The Euthanasia Law does not require the attending physician to
involve the patient's relatives in the euthanasia procedure. However,
the attending physician is required to ascertain that the patient has had
the opportunity to discuss the euthanasia request with the persons
whom she wants to talk to. Some guidelines consider this a quintes-
sential criterion (II, IV, V). One guideline is more strict than the legal
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requirement in that at least one other person in the patient's social
circle has to be involved, even if the patient speciﬁcally refuses and asks
that no relatives be involved (IV). The involvement of family members
and/or important others does not mean that these persons need to
approve the euthanasia request. However, an interpretative dialogue
with the patient's family members and/or important others gives all
actors a deeper insight into the patient's social context and background,
and it might reveal opportunities to strengthen meaningful relation-
ships, communication, and commitment. This might inﬂuence the pa-
tient's perspectives on her suﬀering and her death wish. If the patient
would eventually receive euthanasia, having been involved might limit
the psychological impact, grief, and bereavement of the relatives. If the
patient rejects their involvement, the physician should look for the
underlying motives and try to clarify them. Some guidelines point out
that if the patient's resistance is unwarranted, the consultation proce-
dure might be halted (II, IV, V).
3.4. Involvement of other caregivers
The Euthanasia Law stipulates that, if there is a nursing team that
has regular contact with the patient, the attending physician needs to
discuss the patient's euthanasia request with the nursing team or with
members of that team. However, some guidelines also urge the in-
volvement of all other important caregivers involved in the patient's
treatment (II, IV, V). Besides the nursing team, guidelines II, IV and V
recommend the inclusion of other current or even former caregivers in
an interdisciplinary team in order to further explore and compare the
patient's background and current life context with a view to detecting
any unnoticed meanings of the patient's euthanasia request. As con-
tacting relevant caregivers is deemed quintessential by these guidelines,
the attending and consulted physicians might even need to refrain from
the assessment procedure if the patient does not give permission to
contact any of her caregivers.
Guideline II strongly advises not only the involvement of an inter-
disciplinary team but also the provision of extensive additional support.
Going beyond the legal requirements, this additional support is re-
commended to involve: 1) a central, interdisciplinary End-of-Life
Support Group (covering all the psychiatric centers of this network and
open to external experts), established in order to gain objective and
independent advice; 2) a local End-of-Life Support Group (covering one
or more psychiatric centers in a speciﬁc region), established in order to
gain objective, independent advice or practical support; and, optionally
and especially in cases where the consultation procedure is in an ad-
vanced stage, 3) trained physicians of the Life End Information Forum
(LEIF)(Van Wesemael et al., 2009) for support and advice regarding the
performance of euthanasia.
3.5. Other procedural decision-making aspects
3.5.1. Decision-making procedures
The Euthanasia Law requires that, if the attending physician be-
lieves that the patient is not expected to die within the foreseeable
future, a waiting period of at least one month should be respected be-
tween the patient's written request and the performance of euthanasia.
In addition, as indicated above, the attending physician will need to
consult two physicians instead of one. The advices issued by the con-
sulted physicians are merely advisory (Delbeke, 2011, 2012;
Vansweevelt, 2003).
The guidelines, however, plead for more stringent decision-making
procedures. One guideline (IV) advocates detailed written reports of the
physician's face-to-face discussions, accessible to all physicians and
caregivers involved, so as to enable an open, transparent round-table
discussion, preferably even before formal advices are obtained, in order
to achieve a broader evaluation horizon and enhance the level of due
care.
A built-in safeguard is provided in guideline I in terms of an
additional meeting with the Hospital Ethics Committee in order to a
priori discuss and determine whether or not a euthanasia request can be
declared admissible for further management and evaluation. Guideline
II takes a more restrictive stance and establishes an a priori and inter-
disciplinary evaluation committee consisting of the following 3 groups:
1) staﬀ members from the facility in question: the attending physician,
the chief physician of the department, and two other staﬀ members of
whom at least one is a non-physician; 2) at least two staﬀ members of
the network, with expertise in euthanasia in the context of psychiatry,
though not employed in the facility in question; and 3) at least two
members from outside its walls and hence not employed in the facility,
but with expertise in the euthanasia topic. The chief physician co-
ordinates the evaluation committee. If consensus has been reached, an
appropriate timing and place of death will be planned. In case of dis-
agreement, the evaluation committee will advise the attending physi-
cian against performing euthanasia. Nonetheless, this cannot be en-
forced due to the physician's therapeutic freedom to act in conformity
with her own moral and professional values.
In guideline III, some recommend the establishment of an author-
itative a priori evaluation by an ad hoc committee. This committee
would be complementary to the existing Federal Control and Evaluation
Commission on Euthanasia's a posteriori review. Speciﬁcally in the
context of euthanasia cases for psychological suﬀering, this type of a
priori evaluation is recommended in view of the complexity of decision-
making related to the patient's disorder (e.g. unpredictable prognosis of
a non-terminal illness), the multifactorial reasons underlying the pa-
tient's death wish and the irreversibility of euthanasia. However, others
involved in the drafting of this guideline oppose this proposal, arguing
that an a priori review is against the ‘spirit of the Law’ and would lead
to euthanasia procedures resembling ‘tribunal hearings’.
As for the number of consultations and the duration of the eu-
thanasia procedure, the guidelines recommend that the consultations be
spread over a longer period than the legally required one-month
waiting period. Some guidelines do not specify the required duration (I,
IV), whereas others advocate a waiting period spanning at least
6 months (II) or 1 year (V) taking into account the involvement of all
important actors. In guideline III, some Committee members are in fa-
vour of maintaining the minimum of one month to avoid suicide at-
tempts ‘out of despair’, also in respect of many patients' long medical
history. They also fear the phenomenon of patients ‘shopping’ for more
permissive psychiatrists if the attending physician is inclined to take his
or her time. Other members prefer a waiting period of at least one year
(as the psychiatric state-of-the-art protocol includes one year to give
therapeutic alternatives a fair chance of success and because the eu-
thanasia procedure creates a new patient-physician dynamic that needs
to be fully explored). As observed in practice, the euthanasia procedure
might oﬀer suﬃcient peace of mind, which could be a signal to explore
opportunities for extended aid, rehabilitation, etc. (Thienpont et al.,
2015). Most of the guidelines (I, IV, V) are more restrictive than the
Law as they argue that performing euthanasia is only justiﬁable after
obtaining at least two uniformly positive advices from at least two
consulted psychiatrists. In case of negative advices, these should also be
taken into account. However, none of these guidelines describes to what
extent possible negative advices should aﬀect the euthanasia procedure
and/or the ﬁnal decision.
3.5.2. (After)care for the relatives and friends
As mentioned above, the involvement of the patient's relatives and
important others is quintessential according to several of the guidelines
(II, IV, V). During the assessment of the euthanasia request, these actors
need to be informed regarding: 1) the euthanasia procedure; 2) the
patient's life perspectives; and 3) the physician's ﬁnal decision re-
garding granting or refusing the euthanasia request. This can take place
in close collaboration with the treating physician.
If the patient's relatives and important others are already involved
in the euthanasia procedure, the attending physician should inform and
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invite them for information on the ﬁnal outcome of the euthanasia
procedure. In addition, the involvement of the treating physician (re-
sponsible for the life-track), other caregivers, or a religious oﬃcial who
has a close connection to the patient's relatives and important others,
can be sought. After the euthanasia has been performed, appropriate
aftercare is important to deal with the grief and to soften the mourning.
However, this aspect receives little attention in the guidelines.
3.5.3. Conscientious objection and other value-related factors
In order to balance the respect for the autonomy of the patient who
requests euthanasia and the physicians' freedom of conscience and
professional autonomy, the Euthanasia Law stipulates that no physician
may be forced to perform euthanasia and that, similarly, no other
person may be obliged to assist in performing euthanasia. This provi-
sion is grounded in the right to conscientious objection, a general
principle which is itself founded on the freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion.
Some of the guidelines (II, IV, V) emphasise the need for physicians
to explore their own values and emotions towards euthanasia in general
and their role in the decision-making process and outcomes. However,
the right to conscientious objection should not be seen as a mechanism
to pave the way for ‘absolute value-driven medicine’, as other ethical
principles, such as respect for patient autonomy and compassion with
suﬀering, should also be held in the highest regard. On the other hand,
concerns are expressed regarding some physicians' exclusive focus on
the patient's self-determination, which might render them blind to re-
lational and social aspects that may underlie the euthanasia request and
to mechanisms such as projection, transference, and counter-
transference.
As stated in the Law and in an attempt to reconcile respect for pa-
tient autonomy and the physician's right to conscientious objection, an
attending physician who refuses to perform euthanasia must inform the
patient clearly and in a timely fashion on (the reasons for) this refusal in
order not to create false expectations. If the refusal is based on medical
considerations, these should be noted in the patient's medical record.
Furthermore, a physician who refuses to perform euthanasia must share
the patient's medical record with another physician designated by the
patient, if the patient so requests.
When confronted with conscientious objection within the context of
performance of euthanasia, the guidelines agree with the advice of the
National Board of Physicians (Nationale Raad Orde der Artsen (Belgian
National Board of Physicians), 2017) that the patient – after being
adequately and timely informed – should be referred to a medical in-
stitution concerning the further assessment of the euthanasia request.
However, the physician does not need to ensure this medical in-
stitution's stance and conceivability towards euthanasia performance.
Hence, in case of a physician's conscientious objection, the patient re-
questing euthanasia should thus be referred to a colleague physician
inside or outside the physician's aﬃliated health care facility.
Considering that exploring the underlying reasons for a euthanasia
request might open the door for transference and countertransference,
decision making may be seriously aﬀected by such occurences.
Physicians themselves may be confronted with their own mortality or
loneliness, but also with feelings of helplessness resulting from the in-
ability to suﬃciently alleviate suﬀering, irrational rescue phantasies, or
even complete intolerance towards the patient. Intervision, supervision
or even referral to another, more neutral physician might be needed.
One guideline (I) mentions some procedural guidelines to proactively
protect the integrity and the well-being of the physicians involved.
4. Medically careful performance of euthanasia
According to the Belgian Law on Euthanasia, the act of euthanasia
can only be performed by the attending physician administering a lethal
dose of a suitable drug to the patient. If none of patient's treating
physicians conceives of performing euthanasia herself, the attending
physician can appeal to the competence and expertise of Life End
Information Forum (LEIF)-physicians and/or -nurses to support or even
assist the performing physician if and when needed. One guideline (II)
refers to the particularly challenging situation of euthanasia in an in-
stitutional context as this could act as a potential pull factor for other
patients. The utmost caution needs to be exercised to prevent poten-
tially traumatic eﬀects on other patients. Therefore, it is necessary that
the caregivers involved look for a course of action that maximally
prevents and limits a traumatic impact on fellow patients, both in the
processes of the preparation and performance of euthanasia and at the
stage of aftercare. Another guideline (I) stipulates that euthanasia must
not be performed in the psychiatric ward, but in a single-bed room on a
somatic ward, in the presence of the patient's treating and attending
psychiatrist, and with an anaesthesiologist on stand-by. The required
lethal dose must be prescribed by the staﬀ member of the psychiatry
department. Guideline IV refers to the LEIF-brochure in which is stated
that the performing physician should not be identiﬁed at the end of the
euthanasia procedure, in order to create a trust-based relationship with
the patient and to ensure that all legal requirements are met. This
guideline also refers to the LEIF-brochure for a correct clinical perfor-
mance of euthanasia.
5. A posteriori control: Reporting to the Federal Control and
Evaluation Commission for Euthanasia
In accordance with the Law, the Federal Control and Evaluation
Comission for Euthanasia is composed of 16 members, appointed on the
basis of their knowledge of, and experience with, issues surrounding
euthanasia. Eight of its members are physicians, of whom at least four
are Professors at a Belgian university. In addition, four of its members
are Professors of Law at a Belgian university or practising lawyers, and
the remaining four members are persons who deal with incurably ill
patients on a regular or day-to-day basis. One guideline (V) re-
commends that at least one Commission member needs to be a psy-
chiatrist.
The Law stipulates that the attending physician must submit a re-
port within four days after the euthanasia has been performed. This
report consists of an anonymous part and a part with the identifying
data of the persons involved. The anonymous part includes information
on: 1) the nature of the condition from which the patient suﬀered; 2)
the nature of the patient's suﬀering; 3) the reasons why this suﬀering
could not be alleviated; 4) the elements that assured the physician of
the voluntary, well-considered, and repeated nature of the patient's
euthanasia request; 5) whether the patient was expected to die within
the foreseeable future; and 6) the capacity of all persons consulted and,
with regard to the advising physician(s), their qualiﬁcations and ﬁnd-
ings.
If there is doubt as to whether the legal criteria were met, the
Commission can by a majority decision decide to open the part which
contains the names and addresses of the patient, the attending physi-
cian, the consulted physicians, and the other consulted persons. This
allows the Commission to request the attending physician to provide
any information from the medical record that relates to the euthanasia.
If upon this examination the Commission decides with a two-thirds
majority that the legal criteria have not been met, it is required to refer
the case to the Public Prosecutor.
According to one guideline (I), the patient's death certiﬁcate and the
other documents that should be submitted to the Commission for a
posteriori review should be ﬁlled out by the attending psychiatrist and
not by any of the other physicians or healthcare professionals involved.
In addition to the document drafted by the Commission that has to be
submitted to it as an oﬃcial report for each of the cases of euthanasia
performed, the Flemish Association of Psychiatrists has developed an
additional reporting form that could oﬀer guidance for decision-making
and ﬁnal reporting concerning the euthanasia procedure. This docu-
ment, attached as an appendix to guideline IV, contains questions to be
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answered regarding the integration of the information collected from
the consulted physicians and other persons, the assessment of all legal
due care criteria, and the outcome of the patient's euthanasia proce-
dure. The document can help physicians to obtain from colleague-
physicians essential information concerning the patient and her eu-
thanasia wish. It could also help the attending physician to ﬁll in the
report that needs to be sent to the Federal Control and Evaluation
Commission for Euthanasia within four days after the euthanasia per-
formance.
Guideline III recommends following the Dutch model, where it is
not left to the attending physician to indicate the nature and the content
of the advices obtained from the consulted physicians, but the latter are
themselves required to submit a report to the Commission. This re-
commendation was prompted by evidence that in Belgium euthanasia
cases are sometimes performed in complete disregard of two negative
advices of the consulted physicians or in the absence of suﬃcient ad-
vices (Chambaere, Vander Stichele, Mortier, Cohen, & Deliens, 2019;
Van Wesemael et al., 2011). Moreover, this guideline calls upon the
FCECE to follow the Dutch example and thus to increase transparency
by means of: 1) reporting on its website anonymised data regarding
10% of the reported cases of euthanasia (in proportion to the types of
disorder); and 2) including already in the ﬁrst part of the report the
identifying data of the physicians involved, which would allow the
members of the FCECE to have this information without ﬁrst having to
agree on the opening of the second part of the report.
For an overview of the operationalisations of the substantive and
procedural legal criteria, and of the additions to the procedural legal
criteria recommended by the guidelines, see Tables A and B.
6. Discussion
In the 16 years since the adoption of the Belgian Euthanasia Law,
the number of cases of euthanasia for psychological suﬀering involving
psychiatric patients has signiﬁcantly increased, as has the number of
healthcare organisations (e.g. hospitals and nursing homes) that have
developed and implemented written clinical-ethical policies on the
management of such requests (Gastmans, Lemiengre, & de Casterlé,
2006; Lemiengre, Dierckx de Casterlé, Denier, Schotsmans, & Gastmans,
2008, 2009; Lemiengre, Dierckx de Casterlé, Schotsmans, & Gastmans,
2014).
One guideline (I) that we have analysed is an example of such a
protocol, in that it is describing a transparent procedure to be followed
for requests of euthanasia for psychological suﬀering. The other
guidelines discussed in this paper are published by organisations at the
intermediate level between speciﬁc, local mental health institutions
such as hospitals and nursing homes, and overarching bodies such as
the National Board of Belgian Physicians. They contain detailed prac-
tical advice for interpreting and assessing the requirements of the
Euthanasia Law, and for dealing with various challenges in euthanasia
practice (see Tables A and B).
In many respects the guidelines are more stringent than the Law, for
instance by stipulating that at least two positive advices should be
obtained from at least two psychiatrists, by requiring physicians to
follow a two-track approach, and by proposing a more stringent a priori
evaluation system. Although these guidelines contain recommendations
that resemble the ones put forward in the former Guideline of the Dutch
Psychiatric Association, there are minor diﬀerences, for instance re-
garding the eligibility of a euthanasia request if a psychiatric patient
rejects reasonable treatment options, or regarding the involvement of
important others.
Some guidelines put more emphasis on the practical aspects of the
clinical assessment (I, II and IV), while others focus more on a broad
ethical reﬂection (III and V). Some of the diﬀerences between the
guidelines reﬂect diﬀerent ethical stances towards euthanasia, while
others reﬂect diﬀerences in views regarding the practical implementa-
tion of the legal due care criteria, e.g. the involvement of a Hospital
Ethics Committee (I) versus the establishment of local and central
support groups (II) for preliminary reﬂection, and diﬀerent stances on
whether or not (III), and if so to what extent, the waiting period from
the euthanasia request to the performance should be extended (II, IV,
V).
Notwithstanding the major added value of these guidelines, some
shortcomings remain, as listed in Box C. Although all the guidelines
stress the importance of a decision-making policy that includes many
actors (e.g. the patient's relatives and other care providers) and al-
though they emphasise the importance of good aftercare for the be-
reaved, not much attention has been paid to the aftercare of patients
whose euthanasia request is rejected. One guideline (I) refers the pa-
tient back to his or her treating physician. By contrast, the other
guidelines only mention the (not legally required!) referral procedure in
case of conscientious objection by the physician. This is remarkable, as
evidence from the Netherlands shows that requests for euthanasia from
psychiatric patients (as well as from patients suﬀering from severe
dementia and patients being tired of living) are much less likely to be
granted as compared to requests for euthanasia from patients suﬀering
from physical disorders, and that only a minority of physicians are
willing to perform euthanasia for psychological suﬀering (although the
number is increasing over time) (Bolt, Snijdewind, Willems, van der
Heide, & Onwuteaka-Philipsen, 2015; Kouwenhoven et al., 2013). Well-
founded responses are thus needed concerning the aftercare for patients
whose euthanasia request is not granted. Recent qualitative research
shows that a death wish might diminish, but rarely disappears, in pa-
tients whose euthanasia request has been refused, yet very few treating
physicians further discuss or evaluate the patient's death ideation or
situation after the refusal (Pasman, Willems, & Onwuteaka-Philipsen,
2013). Moreover, none of the guidelines explicitly addresses how, and
to what extent, treating and/or attending physicians should handle
negative or conﬂicting advices, or suicidal threats by the patient in case
of refusal.
Furthermore, in the context of conscientious objections attention
should be paid to avoiding a potential ‘revolving door’ scenario in
which a treating physician who is opposed to euthanasia would refer
the patient to potential attending or consulted physicians, assuming
that they will refuse or advise negatively. This scenario might increase
feelings of despair and suicidal ideation in the patient and may prompt
patients to shop around for physicians who are willing to get involved
in the euthanasia procedure.
Another aspect that could contribute to the risk of the revolving
door and of shopping around by patients, is that diﬀerent guidelines
(some more restrictive than others) may put at risk the uniformity of
the physician's own approach regarding practice of euthanasia for
psychological suﬀering involving psychiatric patients and of the pa-
tients' right of equality in mental health care and that they might also
lead to patients directly contacting the end-of-life centers (which take a
more permissive approach) at their own initiative, without discussing it
ﬁrst with their treating physician.
Despite the guidelines' commendable eﬀorts that may enhance
clinical euthanasia practice, a signiﬁcant knowledge gap remains about
how thoroughly and uniformly euthanasia requests are handled in
Belgium. Moreover, it is unclear how these guidelines are aﬀecting
euthanasia practice, and more speciﬁcally euthanasia for psychological
suﬀering. Unfortunately, empirical research regarding euthanasia
practice remains scarce and is complicated by the lack of an obligation
to register (i.e. only the registration of performed euthanasia requests is
legally required) (Dierickx et al., 2017). Moreover, except from one
study on 100 psychiatric patients in one private clinical practice
(Thienpont et al., 2015), very little is known about the number of eu-
thanasia requests being granted, refused, denied, ongoing or withdrawn
(Van Wesemael et al., 2010). This lack of transparency is surprising,
especially taking into account the heated debate. Although cases of
euthanasia for psychological suﬀering are still rare, the number is in-
creasing. In Belgium, as one of the pioneering countries on euthanasia,
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the clinical and scientiﬁc scrutiny must be rigorous in order to improve
transparency and to ensure the quality of euthanasia practice. There-
fore, the guidelines discussed in this paper should be welcomed given
their strong commitment to mitigate against potential abuses.
It is noteworthy that most of these guidelines were only published
approximately 15 years after the adoption of the Euthanasia Law. This
might be due to increased speculations regarding a slippery slope
concerning euthanasia based on psychological suﬀering, potentially
related to the increase of these euthanasia cases since 2008. This in-
crease in turn might be related to the increasing number of hospital-
based ethics policies and to the foundation of several end-of-life con-
sultation centers since 2011, after which the number of performed
euthanasia cases for psychological suﬀering quadrupled. Moreover, the
euthanasia case that has been referred to the Belgian public prosecutor
in 2015, as well as strong disagreement between some of the end-of-life
consultation centers regarding diﬀerent approaches in the management
of euthanasia requests (Cheng, 2017), have contributed to the need for
more ethical reﬂection and transparency on the clinical practice re-
garding euthanasia based on psychological suﬀering (Haekens,
Calmeyn, Lemmens, Bazan, & Van de Vijver, 2017).
In these respects, the guidelines can be considered as potentially
important instruments to prevent potential abuses by means of pro-
viding information on, and proper operationalisations of, the legal
criteria, recommending more stringent procedural criteria and/or
practical step-by-step decision-making and reporting forms in order to
improve the quality and transparency of Belgian euthanasia practice.
However, the question remains whether and to what extent it might
inﬂuence the practice of euthanasia for psychological suﬀering invol-
ving psychiatric patients and whether, paradoxically, the development
and implementation of several diﬀerent guidelines may fail to achieve
the goal of protecting patients' right to an equal consideration of their
interests in this speciﬁc domain of end-of-life care. In this respect, it
should be noted that equality does not require uniformity of treatment
for all patients, but rather receiving a treatment that conforms to the
regulatory framework and is tailored to the speciﬁc situation of the
patient. Every patient is entitled to an equal consideration of her
(medical) interests.
One end-of-life center is already collaborating with academic re-
searchers for the prospective longitudinal registration of requests for
euthanasia for psychological suﬀering (including euthanasia requests
being carried out, refused, denied, ongoing or withdrawn). We would
warmly recommend other end-of-life centers to follow this example.
Moreover, guideline III calls upon the Federal Control and Evaluation
Commission for Euthanasia to increase transparency. However, the
Commission is not legally obliged to do so and is in fact installing more
barriers to research. In contrast to the situation in the Netherlands, in
Belgium developments in the interpretation and operationalisation of
the substantive and procedural legal requirements, and the potential
problems and complexities of the review system are not the subject of
systematic scientiﬁc research.
In addition, remaining bottlenecks beyond the medical profession
should also be addressed on the political and societal agenda in order to
reduce the socio-economic inequalities that may contribute to unbear-
able suﬀering and may make patients consider euthanasia. The medical
profession is not meant to resolve society's failings by means of eu-
thanasia. On the contrary, it can facilitate and improve rehabilitation
and aftercare (e.g. peer-oriented support groups for patients with re-
jected versus withdrawn euthanasia requests or crustative care).
Another highly important recommendation for the Belgian practice
would be for medical professional organisations (e.g. the National
Board of Physicians) to issue guidelines in an attempt to avoid bottle-
necks and close loopholes, rather than relying on bottom-up approaches
(e.g. initiatives of hospitals and nursing homes) that might impede the
uniformity, transparency, and quality of the euthanasia practice.
As for the latter, these guidelines are established to assess the eu-
thanasia request, and to manage the euthanasia procedure, of patients
who primarily suﬀer from severe mental disorders. It is noteworthy that
mental disorders can vary greatly, especially since the current DSM-5
indicates that an insuﬃcient scientiﬁc basis exists to make distinctions
in the type of mental disorders via the multi-axial system.
As a consequence, the former distinction between Axis I (all clinical
psychiatric disorders except personality disorders and mental retarda-
tion) and Axis 2 (personality disorders and mental retardation) was
abandoned. Mental disorders can also vary greatly from patient to pa-
tient, even among those who are diagnosed with the same disorders.
Moreover, due to the variety in severity of the mental disorders, the
patient's treatment may take place in a variety of settings (ambulant
versus residential in- or outpatient psychiatric treatment) in the absence
of a one-size-ﬁts-all approach. As a consequence, the guidelines concern
the assessment of all psychiatric patients, irrespective of the nature of
their psychiatric disorder (no explicit distinction between former Axis I
and II disorders) or treatment setting, but excluding neuropsychiatric
disorders (e.g. dementia) and without considering the particular si-
tuation of mental retardation and involuntarily committed persons.
As mentioned in some of the guidelines (II and IV), a distinction
needs to be made between the euthanasia request and procedure in-
volving patients suﬀering from psychiatric disorders and those suﬀering
from neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g. dementia). We believe that an-
other distinction needs to be made, and thus an additional guideline is
needed, with regard to psychiatric patients who are involuntarily
committed (e.g. in prison). As prisoners do have the same rights to
medical care as any other Belgian citizen, this implies that they can also
request, and die by means of, euthanasia. Moreover, euthanasias have
already been performed in the medical facilities of Belgian prisons,
based on terminal cancer. However, during the last decade, 20 requests
were registered from mentally ill oﬀenders that were primarily based
on psychological suﬀering (Gutwirth, Devynck, Lemmens, Distelmans,
& Snacken, 2015; Witkowski, Hudson, Batson, Moore, & Mitchell,
2017). Such requests raise additional ethical and legal dilemmas that
should be further discussed and adequately addressed in additional
guidelines.
As regards the value of these guidelines in an international context,
one cannot readily transpose existing guidelines from one jurisdiction
to another. This is not only due to the slightly diﬀerent legal require-
ments (e.g. eligibility criteria, procedural safeguards, and reporting
requirements) regarding this speciﬁc context of end-of-life care.
Interpreting these guidelines for Canada and other countries which
might be considering euthanasia or other means of medically assisted-
dying should also take into account the characteristics of the healthcare
system and the regulatory framework, as well as the diﬀerences in
culture, geographies, and demographics.
Nevertheless, there are lessons that can be learned from the Belgian
situation, other than the top-down approach to address the great need
for guidelines to elaborate and operationalise the legal criteria. For
example, more built-in safeguards are needed to improve the patient's
well-being after refusal and to protect the physicians involved from a
potential passing-the-buck and revolving-door scenario.
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